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Abstract 
The construction industry takes an orthodox approach to safety: Finding root causes, 
quantifying risk, and often blaming frontline workers. However, safety has reached a 
plateau and the limitations of this approach are starting to be acknowledged. A 
sociotechnical systems approach (as applied in the ConCA model) presents new 
opportunities to understand accident causation by linking immediate accident 
circumstances with the distal shaping and originating influences.  
32 construction safety managers, consultants, and experts contributed their views 
regarding the hazards of construction (both human and physical) and the difficulties 
managing these. The findings provide an insight into the work of construction safety 
managers and their decision making which is influenced by industry-wide pressures and 
worker attributes over physical hazards.  
Construction suffers from a wide range of pressures; a combination of both top-down, 
from the client, and bottom-up challenges from the workforce it attracts. The original 
ConCA model has been revised to reflect the findings. By applying systems thinking, the 
relationships between negative perceptions of workers’ risk-taking and these challenges 
can be crystallised. The results support integrating safety into primary activities to 
increase engagement, learning legacies to transfer knowledge between projects, multi-
disciplinary teams to raise risk awareness, empowerment to combat their feelings of 
dissatisfaction and disloyalty, and collaboration in risk management to incorporate 
workers’ expertise and ensure they feel valued. 
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 Beyond ConCA: Rethinking Causality and Construction 
Accidents 
1.  Introduction 
Fatality rates in construction are three times higher than the average across all industries – 
1.94 per 100,000 workers compared to 0.46 across all sectors in the UK (HSE, 2016) and 
10.1 compared to 3.4 in the US (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). The sector contributes 
substantially to the total number of occupational fatalities worldwide: 31% in the UK (HSE, 
2014), 18.9% in the US (NIOSH, 2011) and 20.9% in the EU-28 (Eurostat, 2016). Over the 
last century these statistics have improved significantly, yet progress has plateaued in recent 
years (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015; HSE, 2014). Disillusionment with normative safety 
culture programmes (Guldenmund, 2010; Long, 2012; Sherratt and Dainty, 2017) and 
bureaucratic safety management systems (SMS) (Bieder and Bourrier, 2013; Dekker, 2014) is 
growing. Dekker and Pitzer (2016) claim these traditional forms of safety will never reduce 
accidents to zero because the methods themselves overcomplicate matters and draw focus 
onto trivial risks, leaving organisations vulnerable to catastrophic and highly improbable 
‘black swan’ (Taleb, 2008) events.  
Although construction’s orthodox approach to safety may go some way to explaining this 
decline in safety improvement, progress is also hindered by the project-based nature of the 
industry which requires a dynamic and decentralised network of organisations (Lingard and 
Rowlinson, 2005). Building for a client means designs are unique, profit margins are low, and 
work is suited to a loosely coupled and dynamic network of specialist organisations 
contracted to specific aspects of the build. The temporal nature of work and contracts attracts 
uncommitted and low-skilled workers; subcontracting limits investment in training and safety 
management; financial constraints do not allow for contingencies or new ideas; learning is 
rarely transferred between projects; and the culture of litigation, blame and intolerance stifles 
progress (Harvey et al., 2016a). These difficulties of managing complexity, inconsistency and 
conflicts of interest in these temporary multiple organisations have long been recognised 
(Stringer, 1967) 
This type of organisation presents many obstacles for management, learning, and innovation, 
and as such construction relies on a traditional stance of safety-by-compliance. Its philosophy 
is based on finding the ‘root cause’ of accidents, quantifying risk, and reducing it through 
technological and administrative interventions. In contrast, contemporary safety paradigms 
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encourage a holistic view of jobs, work, and systems (Hale and Hovden, 1998; Wilson, 2014) 
and a humanistic view – focussing on ensuring safe operations, rather than preventing unsafe 
ones – and seeing people as a valuable source of responsiveness and resilience, rather than a 
liability to be constrained (Hollangel, 2014). For safety in construction to continue to 
improve, developing this type of approach could benefit the sector; however, others have 
questioned whether these new concepts are applicable (Harvey et al., 2016b) or necessary 
(Lingard, 2013). 
1.2. Sociotechnical systems and systems thinking  
Sociotechnical Systems (STS) theory developed in the 1950s and originally focussed on the 
impact of technology at work, but has also been applied to risk, health, safety, and accidents 
(Waterson et al., 2015). This era introduced a shift away from traditional perspectives on 
human error towards a more naturalistic and contextualised approach “to provide a ‘holistic’ 
assessment of work–system interfaces and to capture the interaction between these” 
(Waterson et al., 2015). STS sees humans as assets and technology as a tool, and emphasises 
quality of life, respect for individual differences, and respect for stakeholders (Eason, 2008; 
Read et al., 2015). 
The role of social and cultural factors in accidents has been recognised for over 30 years 
(Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997), as well as political, economic, 
legislative and regulatory influences. Fundamental to an STS approach to risk management is 
the belief that accidents “are not only caused by direct physical events, nor by human errors 
alone. They have their roots in organisational settings and in the sociotechnical system 
companies are active in” (Swuste, 2008). Therefore, when considering the role of humans in 
accidents, a systems focus is vital – taking account of context, interactions, complexity, 
emergence and alternative perspectives (Wilson, 2014).  
1.3. Systems thinking in construction 
There have been calls for construction to move away from a ‘root cause’ mentality towards 
accidents since the turn of the millennium (Gibb et al., 2001). Several studies looking into the 
factors affecting performance on construction sites emphasise managing safety at every level 
of the system (Sawacha et al., 1999); In particular, the Construction Accident Causation 
(ConCA) model promotes a holistic view of incidents (Haslam et al., 2005). The model 
shows the relationships between the immediate circumstances causing an accident, and the 
factors which shape and originate it – following in the footsteps of Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ 
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metaphor (Reason, 2000) (Figure 1). It demonstrates the requirement for a collaborative 
effort to own and manage risk from the client team, concept designers, project management, 
preconstruction planners and the industry as a whole, and to ensure risk management robust, 
integrated and participatory (Gibb et al., 2006).  
 
Figure 1 – The ConCA model (Haslam et al., 2005) 
An integrated approach has been shown to support project success (Franz et al., 2017), 
organisational learning (Behm and Schneller, 2013), the relationship between designers and 
constructors, (Atkinson and Westall, 2010), teamwork between trades (Baiden and Price, 
2011) and safety leadership, by developing trust and communication throughout the system 
(Donovan et al., 2016). Systems thinking has been applied to demonstrate the emergence of 
events, such as why safety outcomes are often inconsistent with inspection results (Saurin, 
2016) or supposed leading indicators (Lingard et al., 2017). However, a need for further 
research into systems thinking in construction has been recognised (Love et al., 2016); While 
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in other sectors systems models have progressed and developed, ConCA remains the best fit 
for construction.  
The existing literature on systems dynamics modelling in construction often takes a ‘hard’ 
(Scholz and Tietje, 2002, p. 120) or objective approach to modelling the complexity of 
construction organisations and performance, based on data mining of accident reports (Chi 
and Han, 2013), existing literature (Shin et al., 2014), or simulations (Goh and Askar Ali, 
2016). Conversely, literature on risk management and risk-taking focuses on the range of 
proximal and distal factors which predispose workers to these behaviours (Choudhry and 
Fang, 2008; Oswald et al., 2014) but rarely explore the relationships between these and where 
they originate from (Asilian-Mahabadi et al., 2014).  
1.4. The present study and organisation of the paper 
The aim of this study was to review the credibility of the ConCA model with a panel of 
expert interviewees. Their perception of the system, the pressures they face, and the factors 
which shape their decision-making and leadership style were discussed and mapped onto the 
original framework. This included the intrinsic hazards of the building process, the 
workforce, and the wider system. These data were used to crystallise relationships between 
these factors and substantiate the systemic nature of accident causation.   
The findings are presented as 2 sections. First looking bottom-up at the nature of work and 
the workforce, then looking top-down at the organisational and industrial challenges. The 
discussion brings these together drawing out 5 key themes, or common perceptions of 
workers, and exploring their systemic origins. Finally, a developed and updated version of the 
ConCA model is proposed which gives a fuller picture of accident causation.   
2. Method 
2.2. Study design 
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH), ergonomics, built environment, and STS are all 
research fields which have been said to take an overly pragmatic approach to research 
(Dekker et al., 2012; du Toit and Mouton, 2012; Shannon et al., 1999; Waterson et al., 2015). 
A qualitative approach is advocated to gain a deeper understanding of the social phenomena 
involved – in this case decision making and risk-taking. In particular, interviewing was 
chosen as it gathers meaning-laden and contextualist data to explore and make sense of these 
constructs.  
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A draft protocol was developed based on investigators notes from a focus group with 14 
participants who discussed the key issues facing safety and health in construction projects. 
This ensured the scope of the questions would cover a sufficient breadth of human and 
technical factors at all levels of the system, in accordance with STS theory. The questions 
were chosen to gain an in-depth understanding the role of those managing risk in construction 
with each question focussing on a different facet – hazards, challenges, workers’ attitudes, 
and factors contributing to unsafe acts. This was piloted with 1 participant to confirm the 
questions and probes were thought-provoking and the responses relevant and valuable. The 
final semi-structured interview protocol was designed comprising of 5 questions (Appendix 
1). 
Limiting the questions to a loose schedule helped to achieve a ‘rich’ (dense and meaningful), 
saturated dataset focussed on these areas of interest (Guest et al., 2006), which in turn 
maximises the potential to find meaning (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). However, a semi-
structured design was chosen as it allows a balance between gathering rich and focussed data 
and keeping the feel open and conversational; this builds rapport between the participant and 
investigator, encouraging them to share stories and examples from their own experience 
(Rabionet, 2011). A semi-structured design also supports probing or following-up responses 
to understand their meaning (Given, 2008) which is important given the exploratory research 
question. 
2.3. Participants 
Participants were recruited through the researchers’ contacts and snowballing the invitation to 
participants’ colleagues. Judgement sampling was applied (based on occupation and 
experience) to create a sample of construction safety experts with maximum variation within 
this inclusion criterion; this included those involved in different roles within the risk 
management process – such as research, policy-making, training, and consultancy, as well as 
frontline managers – from a range of organisations. The sample included predominantly 
safety managers working for (or having previously worked for) construction, infrastructure, 
architecture, and civil engineering companies. These were global or multinational tier-1 
suppliers (in direct contact with the client) headquartered in the UK, US or EU, and 
employing between 4,000 and 48,500 employees. All the participants had at least 5 years’ 
experience working on or researching large projects with a strong commitment to safety. The 
mean (SD) experience of participants was 22.45 (13.24) years. This does not include previous 
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experience working in health and safety in sectors other than construction which they drew 
on for comparison. 
Table 1 - Study participants and their roles 
Role Pilot Focus Group 
Pilot 
Interview 
Recorded 
Interview 
Health and safety manager or director 9  10 
Health and safety training coordinator 1  1 
Construction manager 1  1 
Self-employed risk consultant 2  3 
Academic with previous employment in construction  1  6 
Academic researching construction safety  1 4 
Total 14 1 25 
The specialised inclusion criteria increased the chances of reaching data saturation, but its 
internal diversity also ensured as many present themes as possible were captured (Guest et 
al., 2006). Data collection ended when ‘data saturation’ was reached and no novel codes 
were added to the coding structure during analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 53 potential 
participants were contacted yielding 25 recorded interviews (Response rate 47%). 8 
participants from the pilot focus group went on to participate in a recorded interview; they 
were not counted twice, leaving 6 plus 25 and one pilot interviewee, giving a total of 32 
individuals contributing to the dataset. 
2.4. Data collection 
Interviews were conducted between October 2015 and January 2016 by telephone (n = 15), 
Skype™ (n = 1), and in person (n = 9) depending on the most convenient method for the 
participant. All the interviews were conducted by a single investigator. The duration of the 
recordings ranged from 20min to 60min, with an average of 37min. 
2.5. Analysis  
The recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim and the complete dataset contained 
140,000 words. All coding was completed by the same investigator to ensure consistency. 
Open coding was used to assign a theme to each sentence, taking an inductive approach to 
categorising trends. The codes identified were reduced by grouping similar and redundant 
themes into an axial or tree structure and opening up dense codes to develop their sub-
themes. Unlike induction or deduction – best used either in unresearched territories or to test 
theories respectively (Bryman, 2012; Walliman, 2011) – abduction (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002) describes a process whereby empirical observations are used to refine a proposed 
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framework and coproduce knowledge (Green et al., 2010) – in this case further developing 
the ConCA model (Haslam et al., 2005). 
3. Findings 
3.2. Hazards in construction 
The initial questions sought to extract the problems and pressures of the construction industry 
which make risk difficult to manage. Participants’ responses to these two questions often 
provided overlapping content, demonstrating the interwoven nature of hazards and validating 
the use of STS analysis to understand this complex system. The interaction between the 
intrinsic hazards of construction and the risks caused or exacerbated by poor management 
was most clearly demonstrated by the participants who questioned whether describing 
construction as hazardous was correct and instead felt poor management (of risks and the 
project as a whole) was at fault. 
I don’t think construction is dangerous, I think what’s dangerous about construction is not truly 
understanding the hazards that construction presents, and therefore not evaluating the risks 
associated with those hazards, not properly designing out hazards. Safety Manager  
Intrinsic hazards involved in construction work 
17 themes were extracted which relate to the intrinsic hazards of the construction process, as 
opposed to management issues which interact with these or introduce their own risks. These 
are illustrated as a tree diagram in Figure 2. The number in brackets following each subject in 
the figures show the number of responses including that theme. These numbers are 
aggregated into high-level themes, where the same participant is only counted once, but 
which also include responses from other participants about the overall topic that could not be 
subcategorised.   
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1Figure 2 - The intrinsic hazards involved in construction processes 
Features of construction process such as dangerous materials, tools and the physical nature of 
work were identified, as well as the hazards of building within a context of physical 
geography and existing infrastructure. Working at a height was also a recurring theme which 
reflects its importance as one of the major causes of fatalities (HSE, 2014). Nevertheless, 
these physical hazards were overshadowed by the changing nature of construction projects, 
the effects of which were universally recognised. This included both external changes, such 
as weather and unanticipated hazards of the site, and internal changes as the workplace grows 
and materials are transported.  
The biggest thing about construction is that it’s permanently temporary until the day we finish, 
and everything changes all the time, even the things you’ve done the same are different. Safety Manager 
Walls go up and so all of a sudden our fire escape routes need to change, or we’ve dug a trench 
across the- the ground and now we have to change our whole traffic management system. Risk Consultant 
As well as physical hazards within a changing environment, many participants chose to 
discuss the way these hazards are exacerbated, and other risks introduced, by industry and 
workplace factors. These are explored in ‘Risk management difficulties’. 
                                                 
1 The shading in Figures 2 to 4 is to improve readability and carries no meaning. 
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The construction workforce 
The intrinsic hazards of the construction process would not have such potential for harm if 
not for the proximity of the workforce within these activities.   
You’ve got machinery and humans together which as we know is a terrible mix … in a factory 
hopefully either the machinery’s moving and the people are stood still or vice versa, we’ve got both 
happening at the same time! Construction Manager 
Undoubtedly, people play a role in creating risk in construction; it is human nature to be 
variable, unpredictable, prone to error, and to struggle with change, but there are many 
factors which make those attracted to work in construction – typically young, agile, men – 
particularly susceptible to unsafe acts. Table 2 is a matrix which compares demographics of 
the construction workforce with common traits that were seen to increase their propensity to 
take risks. The shading shows where participants drew links between the characteristics of the 
workforce and these demographics – dark for a strong association, and light for possible. As 
with figure 2, the numbers in brackets represent the number of respondents who spoke about 
each characteristic.  
Table 2 - Demographics of the construction workforce which exacerbate risk taking behaviours 
   Demographic 
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Competence 
Lack of interest in safety (12)      
Not academically interested (8)      
Language barriers (6)      
Lack of qualifications (4)      
Attributes 
Physically capable (12)      
High need to achieve (7)      
Loyalty to colleagues (7)      
Resourceful (4)      
No family commitments (2)      
Background Others’ low expectations of them (8)      Challenging histories (5)      
Behaviours 
Lack of discipline (7)      
Laziness (6)      
Lacking common sense (3)      
Aggressiveness (1)      
Attitude 
Low expectations of themselves (6)      
Closed-minded (5)      
Fear of being different (4)      
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The requirements for education and language skills are low, and the short-term contracts 
provided by project-based work are appreciated by workers who are young and free from 
responsibilities, and therefore able to work long hours and travel. Construction workers are 
known for being tough and physically capable, but this can cause workers to push themselves 
beyond safe (and healthy) limits because they believe they are fit, strong, flexible, and have 
good balance and stamina enabling them to cope with the tasks.  
Many of the factors in Table 2 lead workers to engage in risk denial: The male-dominance of 
the industry pushes workers to show they are able to cope with its risks; economic 
disadvantage means workers act to cut-corners and save money; age can mean workers are 
complacent based on their physical capability (young) or experience (older); and workers 
with low academic attainment are less likely to fully understanding the risks. The diversity of 
nationalities working in construction is also a demographic of the workforce which 
exacerbates risk taking behaviours, although rather than the denial of risk, this can be 
attributed to misunderstandings due to language barriers, different expectations of OSH, and 
a lack of standardised international qualifications.   
Unfortunately, the type of work attracts workers with traits which, while desirable from a 
production perspective, mean they can be unpredictable, complacent and prone to risk-taking. 
Positive attributes such as being hardworking, innovative, and free from commitments can 
have a negative impact on judgement. 
One worker actually said to me: “If I die, my parents are the only ones that are gonna miss me.” Academic  
This recklessness suggests workers lack an appreciation of their worth and their impact on 
those around them. The desire to be seen as a hard worker can be partially attributed to the 
importance of reputation for securing work in the industry, but can also be interpreted as a 
product of workers’ backgrounds – low academic attainment and economic disadvantage. 
The low expectations held by others and of themselves fuel a strong need to achieve and be 
seen as helpful and resourceful.  
In [area] we tend to be a bit poorer and we think a bit more creatively… ‘cos they’re trying to save 
money and we’ve gotta tell them that their safety- well we do tell them that their safety is much 
more important than any amount of money in the world. Training Coordinator 
Seeking excitement (4)      
Fear of speaking publicly (2)      
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Another reason why construction is risky is some people are very keen- which is an admirable trait- 
very keen to help others, and almost jump in when they can’t- when they haven’t got the 
competence to do that particular task, to try and help out. Safety Manager  
Another trait mentioned by participants was a fear of speaking in public – a skill which is not 
important for construction work – but which, alongside peer pressure, can contribute to an 
unwillingness to report unsafe incidents. This lack of confidence combined with the low 
expectations, low sense of personal value, and a strong need to achieve suggest one factor 
contributing to construction workers’ cavalier attitude to risk is a desire to prove they are 
capable.  
Construction workers’ attitude towards risk 
Participants felt workers’ attitudes varied significantly both between and within individuals 
depending upon the activities or circumstances, but overall were improving with time. Brace, 
Gibb, Pendlebury and Bust (2009) categorised attitudes to risks as “sensation seekers”, 
deniers”, “acceptors” or “avoiders” (p.194). These are expanded upon based on participants’ 
descriptions: A distinction was made between sensation deniers who are genuinely oblivious 
to the risks, and those who are aware yet deny a risk’s potential for harm; a further distinction 
between sensation acceptors for whom this acceptance made them either more tolerant or 
more mindful of the risks; and the addition of a ‘risk appreciators’ category. These categories 
are described in Table 3 and Figure 3.
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Table 3 - Construction workers' attitudes to risk 
Attitude to risk 
Participants 
stating workers 
hold this attitude 
Quotation Description 
Risk Averse 3 
You’ve also got people who- perhaps towards- 
later in their working careers are much more 
risk-averse. ID 5 
A few construction workers, particularly older workers, are risk 
averse. They are seen as a memorable exception to the norm 
given the nature of the work. 
Risk Respecting 6 Some accept it’s just part of the environment, but it can be managed effectively. ID 3 
Workers are aware of the risks and are pragmatic about risk 
management. 
Risk Accepting 6 
The workers themselves are pretty aware of 
the risks. Whether they do anything about it 
I’m not quite sure! ID 18 
Workers are aware of the risks but these are normalised as part of 
construction work. They become desensitised and are unlikely to 
challenge unsafe conditions. 
Risk Denying 10 
Whilst these guys appreciate that there are 
risks, he thinks “Hey, I can make £25 more for 
less time!” and so that- so the risk in a sense is 
almost carted. ID 25 
Workers are aware of the risks but deny their potential for harm 
because their judgement is influenced by complacency or 
conflicting priorities. 
Risk Oblivious 11 I honestly don’t think that they see the risk out there. ID 24 
Workers are unaware of the risks they face. This could be due to a 
lack of experience, competence, or training, and particularly 
regarding the work of other trades which could interact with their 
own. 
Risk Appreciating 4 
Construction workers actually like and 
embrace risk, ‘cos it’s exciting, it’s innovative, 
it’s dynamic. ID 3 
The risks and challenges of construction work are a significant 
factor in workers’ job satisfaction: They enjoy working in new 
and varied environments, thrive on problem solving, and take 
pride in facing challenges others might think too difficult. 
Risk Seeking 3 
My biggest worry would be with our young 
people is that they do they think they’re 
immortal and they will try things. ID 2 
Some construction workers were actively ‘risk seekers’, but these 
attitudes predominantly occurred among younger workers and 
rare “mavericks” (Risk Consultant). 
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Figure 3 - Risk tolerance verses risk awareness of different worker attitudes 
Factors shaping the acceptability of risk 
The significant numbers who felt that construction workers were oblivious to risk, and many 
more who said they had a high tolerance or poor understanding of risk, prompted an in-depth 
analysis of the factors participants felt influenced this. 
Complacency was a prominent theme, said to be caused by either experience or previous 
positive outcomes; familiarity with such situations; or distancing – an “it would never happen 
to me” mindset.  
Other significant negative effects were attributed to a lack of competence or training about 
risk, and a poor or macho safety culture. Conversely, participants felt workers perceived the 
risks as less acceptable if they had experience of previous accidents, had commitments to 
family or friends and colleagues, management were committed to enforcing safety, and the 
location of work felt dangerous (e.g. underground or at sea).    
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They’ve all sort of seen something they’d prefer not to…they turn round and think “Well hang on, 
the ambulance isn’t gonna come toddling up the road, there isn’t one” you know? So whatever 
happens you’ve gotta survive it for at least- well if you’re off shore at least an hour. Risk Consultant 
There were several factors which have potential to have either a positive or negative effect, 
such as peer pressure and previous experience of the construction industry, national culture, 
and age. Participants were evenly split as to whether older workers became more or less 
tolerant to risk with experience, and similarly participants felt younger workers were either 
aware of their lack of experience or thought they were invincible. Variability can also be seen 
within the international demographics of the construction industry: Workers who have been 
exposed to poor safety attitudes in other countries may have no concept of formal safety 
management systems, making them difficult to control, whilst other cultures take a rigid 
approach to rules meaning their obedience is advantageous for safety.  
When the magnitude or consequence of a risk is perceived as high and uncontrollable, 
workers were said to be more cautious; however, this could also have a negative influence as 
serious risks such as high voltage current or working at a height can overshadow smaller risks 
making these seem more acceptable. Workers were thought less likely to perceive a risk if it 
was relevant to their trade, and they had therefore become complacent about it, or it was not 
relevant to their trade, and they did not understand it. This also meant workers were likely to 
only take ownership of risks relevant to their trade and compartmentalise their management. 
Communication about risk management meant workers were more vigilant, but 4 participants 
said risk management measures had the potential to encourage tolerance because, in 
accordance with risk homeostasis theory (Adams, 1995; Wilde, 1982), workers feel the risks 
have been adequately controlled. Finally, if workers felt valued by management, that their 
skill was valuable, had recent training, or were trained in multiple trades they were less 
tolerant to risk. As seen in the previous section, attitudes to risk in construction are highly 
varied and subject to the complex interaction of many factors.   
Factors leading to unsafe acts 
Factors such as experience, training and culture, influence the acceptability of risk; however, 
participants also spoke of the pressures and distractions that could cause workers to behave 
unsafely, regardless of whether they felt the level of risk was acceptable. 
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Figure 4 - Factors which can cause workers to make unsafe decisions 
Whether or not a worker chooses to accept a risk depends upon its perceived benefits whether 
these are worth the risk (Adams, 1995; HSE, 2004). Figure 4 shows that participants felt 
workers were often motivated to take risks by money, peer pressure, time pressure, and 
concern for their reputation. As well as these trade-offs, some participants mentioned 
dissatisfaction as a motivation for unsafe acts, particularly where they felt restricted or 
patronised by safety measures, and a few said they would act unsafely if distracted by a 
mobile phone or personal issues.    
The trouble is the workers will latch onto this [inappropriate safety measures] and see this as an 
inability of the management to be flexible, in what they’re doing, and then they sort of rebel 
against that, and there is resentment and a negative attitude. Academic 
Workers took unsafe actions because they were not aware of the risks themselves or their 
impact on others. In particular, workers were more likely to behave unsafely if they were not 
aware of the consequences of the risk and lacked knowledge or experience around it. More 
complex risks, where the hazard develops from combination of causes, and those outside a 
worker’s trade were also likely to be missed. 
Attitudes towards risks are an important consideration, but one of many factors which 
contribute to the decision-making process of weighing up knowledge and awareness of risk 
against pressures, priorities, and distractions. So far, unsafe acts have been discussed from an 
individual perspective – the factors that affect the acceptability of risk (Section 3.2) and 
decision-making (Figure 4) – however, these should be seen in the context of the wider 
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system: Participants also spoke about many team, workplace and organisational influences 
which can affect someone’s propensity to act unsafely and show the importance of not 
placing blame at the frontline.  
To some extent the conflicting factors in Figure 4 can be seen as products of both the 
workforce and the industry: Time pressure may stem from a desire to finish early but also the 
client or poor planning;  reputation is important to secure work in a competitive industry; 
poorly designed Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is bulky, uncomfortable, and interferes 
with operations; showing off shows a desire to be accepted into a transient community; and 
being motivated by money is not only an individual trait but one which reflects the sector as a 
whole and companies’ desire to stay in business. It is clear that sacrificing safety is not an 
individual’s choice but a complex decision based on many pressures and issues.  
3.3. The wider challenges involved in managing risk  
Thus far, the intrinsic hazards of construction have been extracted, and aspects of the 
construction workforce which participants felt increased workers’ propensity for risk taking 
behaviours. The remaining data related to other issues which made managing risk difficult in 
construction. These codes were grouped into a tree structure, ordered into a hierarchy of 
distance from the frontline based on ConCA (Originating Influences, Shaping Factors, and 
Immediate Circumstances) and ranked according to prevalence (Table 4). The relationships 
between these factors, and the site and workforce challenges already identified, are explored 
in section 4.2 of the Discussion.  
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Table 4 - Industry, Organisational and Workplace factors which make managing risk difficult 
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4. Discussion 
The findings show the range of challenges that influencing decision making: Construction 
work is high-hazard in combination with constant change making risks difficult to control; 
the demographics of the workforce (young, male, international, and with low levels of 
education and economic privilege) are associated with characteristics that exacerbate risk-
taking behaviours; and the project-based, client-driven structure of the sector is competitive, 
unregulated and litigious.   
Primarily, workers were seen as oblivious to the risks or tolerant and willing to deny the risk 
in the face of other priorities. However, a holistic or systems thinking approach to analysis 
helps to reveal the complex relationships between this and other immediate, shaping and 
originating causes of accidents – challenging the tendency to blame workers and look for a 
“root cause”. The systemic origins of 5 worker attributes that were seen to cause accidents – 
low engagement with safety, ‘silo working’, lack of competence ‘cutting corners’ and a high 
risk tolerance – are explored in the following section.  The industry-wide factors which cause, 
attract, and exacerbate these behaviours demonstrate the value of systems thinking to address 
construction risks.  
4.2. Worker traits and their systemic origins  
Low engagement with safety 
On the surface workers are seen to lack interest in safety and therefore fail to engage in risk 
management. However, this is a relationship which goes both ways: not only do workers fail 
to engage with management, but management fail to engage with the workforce. Although 
the workers are the experts in the task, it is presumed they are risk-takers who need to be 
controlled and this limits collaboration; thus, because their expertise is not valued, they 
disengage from the project. Many of the participants recognised the need for enhanced 
collaboration, but the project-based nature of the industry makes this difficult: Learning is 
disrupted in temporary organisations and there is limited time built into the schedule to gather 
input from the workforce during the design phase.  
This lack of engagement means safety becomes an afterthought and policies are ill-suited to 
the context, making sweeping generalisations about the nature of construction work. Poorly 
designed procedures and equipment cause workers to become cynical and, again, disengaged 
because they feel they have little influence or value. They become disobedient (either as a 
pragmatic reality of getting work done or as an act of animosity), resentful of their 
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employers, and demonise OSH – perpetuating the disconnect between workers and safety 
which is perceived as their lack of interest. This emphasises the importance of integrating 
safety into primary work activities so they suit the context and support, rather than hinder, 
efficient work.   
It is clear some effort is needed to break the vicious cycle of managements’ mistrust and rigid 
rules leading to workers’ disengagement and disobedience. Although workers appear 
uninterested in safety, this could be because they are not given timely opportunities to 
engage, do not expect to be engaged with, or have become cynical about safety because their 
input is not valued. Rather than blaming workers’ lack of interest, it is important to recognise 
the impact of this as well as peer pressure, fear of school-like situations, intimidation from 
professionals, cynicism, and a misperception of OSH staff as enforcers. Acknowledging these 
reasons for low engagement shows where interpersonal skills and guidance for engaging with 
workers could be developed and improved in light of this. 
‘Silo working’  
Similarly, as a result of low engagement between workers and management, workers are seen 
to work in silos – compartmentalising their role and the risks associated with it.  
When they’re just treated as a part in a much bigger picture- jigsaw, and your part isn’t that 
important- or that’s how they perceive it perhaps, then their interest in that project and that 
organisation, and risk, is diminished. Academic 
Workers contracted to do a specific task for a specified price rarely appreciate the 
significance of their role in relation to the project. Accidents can happen because they fail to 
see the ‘big picture’; how their work might interact with other trades on site or the wider 
impact the risks they take could have. On one hand this could be seen as a lack of 
competence, but it is also indicative of problems within the project-based nature of 
construction: Projects need specific skills for certain periods of time and work to a tight 
schedule. Brief temporary contracts allow little time or incentive to invest in training, and 
workers are under pressure to finish their tasks and move on. The system is not set up to 
allow relationships between trades to develop and instead they become inward-looking, 
defensive, and isolated, which narrows their perception of risk.  
Several participants felt that workers’ perception of risk was higher if their trade was valued, 
particularly if their work was visible in the finished building, and they had an awareness they 
were contributing to something they could be proud of. Projects are more likely to be safe 
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and successful if workers understand their role as part of a larger project, particularly if the 
project is high-profile (Bolt et al., 2012). Some participants also felt training workers in skills 
other than their own would help them to identify the hazards of other trades. However, 
although autonomy and job rotation have been shown to improve job satisfaction (Parker et 
al., 2017; Waterson, 2015), it would be difficult to justify and implement this in a transient 
environment where the skills required are highly specialised.   
Lack of competence 
Under the broad term of competence, participants referred to not only a lack of technical 
competence in one’s own trade, but an awareness of safe practice, the work of other trades, 
and the interactions between site activities. This highlights the breadth of skills and traits 
needed to manage risk successfully and the tendency of managers to oversimplify and 
dismiss an incident as a ‘lack of competence’. To improve workers’ competence there is a 
need for further training; however, the lack of investment in workers due to specialised 
trades, project schedules, and temporary contracts has already been discussed. There is also a 
lack of regulation of construction companies which fails to prevent a lack of competence 
leading to incidents.    
You could set up a construction business tomorrow … it’s a low level of entry into the market, and 
that exposes people to risks and hazards that they’re not capable of controlling. Safety Manager 
This is exacerbated by a lack of resources and low profit margins. The role of the 
construction sector, as a provider of engineering solutions within other domains, means profit 
must be reaped from the supply chain and building processes. By employing the cheapest 
workers construction firms can reduce their outgoings, but these are often those with the 
lowest competence levels. Several participants spoke about the difficulties of resisting 
pressure from clients who were determined to keep costs down at the expense of employing, 
competent, qualified and safe personnel.   
A more general lack of competence (for example, academic and social attainment) can also 
lead to risk-taking behaviours. Participants said workers chose construction because “they’re 
well down the food chain when it comes to where they’re going in life” (Safety Manager) and 
were incapable of doing anything else. From a systems perspective, it is important to 
understand why construction work attracts these workers: Although some trades are highly-
skilled, the requirements for general labouring are quickly learnt; physical agility is prized 
over mental; and good social and language skills are rarely necessary. Construction suits 
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workers with these traits, but this introduces management problems for those in charge. 
Again, these issues are embedded within the nature of construction work and the project-
based industry, but to improve safety it is important to understand why construction workers 
lack the necessary competence so training and regulation can focus on addressing these.        
‘Cutting Corners’ 
Shortcuts to save time and money were often seen as driven by laziness, but also 
symptomatic of a culture among construction workers to solve problems and prove 
themselves to be resourceful, capable and productive.  
What we want people to do is stop and reflect, what they tend to do is to go in to automatic 
problem solving … you know, “What would I get congratulated for, would I be congratulated for 
stopping work? Or would I be congratulated if I solve the problem?”  Safety Manager 
Participants felt workers had been conditioned by the customary lack of resources to rush and 
improvise, and there was a widespread expectation that prioritising cost and schedule over 
safety would be rewarded. Even in cases where projects were well-managed and safety 
budgeted for, it was difficult to change the attitudes of workers who were not used to work 
being open for discussion, projects being planned well, and companies being committed to 
workers’ wellbeing.  
Pressure from clients – who were said to be more concerned with cost, schedule, and 
reputation than safe operation – was seen as the source of this: Participants provided 
examples of clients who appointed the cheapest firms, imposed penalties for contractors who 
took longer than planned, and sacked those involved in accidents to the dismay of the safety 
managers who could no longer learn from and improve upon the situation. These actions 
show a limited appreciation of construction processes, especially safety, and an unwillingness 
to take ownership of risk or invest in anything other than the end product. The subcontracted 
structure also creates opportunities for clients to pass the blame down to subcontractors, who 
in turn look to blame the primary contractor or client. 
Low profit margins, compounded by a fear of litigation, can be seen to underpin corner 
cutting at all levels of the industry. Risk management is based on meeting the minimum 
standards for compliance: Safety policies were said to be reactive, disproportionate, not 
evidence based, rarely reviewed, and taking a broad-brush approach to cope with constant 
change. The extensive use of PPE, signage, and site rules to keep workers safe shows a 
reliance on the “the last line of defence” (Risk Consultant) rather than good planning and 
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design. This profit-driven, and hence corner cutting, culture is inevitable in a competitive 
sector, and the most fundamental of the systemic issues it faces.  
High risk tolerance  
Most participants agreed construction workers had either an accepting or denying attitude 
towards risk, and some said they enjoyed the thrills and challenges of the work. In part, this is 
due to the potential for varied, physical, outdoor, and exciting work which attracts individuals 
with a risk tolerant personality. Often, these are young men who are flexible, hardworking, 
and problem solvers, and, although these traits are desirable for production, they tend to 
coincide with unpredictability, complacency and risk-taking. As discussed in the previous 
sections, the construction workforce is also known for its low levels of academic attainment, 
social skill, and economic privilege: Their low expectations can be seen to drive a need to 
achieve – cutting corners and saving money.  
This is another clear example of the connection between risk tolerance and risk-taking at the 
frontline and the nature of construction as a distributed system which attracts unskilled and 
uncommitted workers who are difficult to manage. Risk tolerance is not a fixed trait but 
dependent upon pressures and incentives such as time, comfort, money, and reputation. These 
factors motivate workers to sacrifice safety and appear to have a high tolerance for risk, but 
in fact, these are initiated by systemic issues: Poor planning, tight schedules, poorly designed 
equipment and insensitive procedures; fear of litigation, and an expendable view of the 
workforce are all brought on by a lack of resources and stability. A high tolerance for risk can 
also be attributed to a lack of awareness, due to insufficient training, or disobedience, due to 
dissatisfaction, as already mentioned.  
An improved understanding of the type of worker attracted to construction, and the pressures 
they face, can support safety managers’ strategy to tackle unsafe acts. Greater empathy and 
autonomy could combat dissatisfaction, a balanced safety policy to maintain elements of 
construction which inspire workers and provide job satisfaction, and training to enhance risk 
awareness could all help lower workers’ risk tolerance. However, more difficult to tackle are 
the organisational pressures which influence the culture of the organisation. Proving the roots 
of these problems identified here would provide evidence to challenge the view that workers 
are rebellious, negligent and complacent, and instead show they are scapegoats in a flawed 
system.  
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4.3. Summary of findings 
The findings provide an insight into the work of construction safety managers. It is clear they 
face not only the intrinsic hazards of a physical, dynamic work in challenging locations, but 
also managing a difficult demographic of workers, and competing with the pressures of an 
unstable and financially squeezed industry.  
Construction is just a big game of risk, companies go under all the time, because sort of tender 
decisions are taking a risk- it is- it’s what we’re kind of used to. Academic 
All three facets of the problem were explored - the work itself, the workforce, and its 
management. Construction is unstable, not only in terms of the workplace they are building, 
but its finances, workforce, and the systems in place to manage these. Its dynamic nature 
prevents the transfer of knowledge between projects and the implementation of consistent and 
well-designed safety measures (policies, training, culture, quality standards etc.). Lines of 
accountability become unclear in temporary organisations, leading to the shirking of safety 
responsibilities – by both the client and subcontractors – and a culture of blame and litigation. 
By exploring the wider organisational or industry-wide challenges it is possible to see the 
shaping influence these factors have on the structure and workforce of construction and the 
difficulties influencing safe behaviour.  
4.4. Systemic causes of risk in construction  
There is a clear need to tackle the roots of unsafe acts embedded within the construction 
industry; however, it is difficult to know how to approach change and who to hold 
responsible.  
By using an STS lens on construction, the relationships between the issues which safety 
managers expressed have been explored to disentangle hazards from poor management, and 
poor worker attitudes from the industry-wide factors which attract and exacerbate these.   
This analysis provides evidence to challenge blame at the frontline: Many of the complaints 
about workers’ poor attitude (such as ‘silo working’, cutting corners, high risk-tolerance and 
a lack of ownership, competence and engagement) can all be traced to systemic issues around 
the nature of construction work and pressures from the wider sociotechnical system. In light 
of this, the ConCa model (Gibb et al., 2006; Haslam et al., 2005) has been redrawn (Figure 5) 
to show how the site, technology and worker factors which combine to form accidents are 
framed within managerial and industrial originating and shaping influences.  
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Figure 4 - ConCa + 
Quantitatively, when asked about the causes of risk in construction, participants were more 
inclined to discuss the difficulties of managing a complex project – dealing with clients, 
subcontracting, and accountability – and worker attributes – a macho and complacent 
workforce This is in contrast to the original ConCA model (Figure 1) which elaborated more 
on the site and technology. Unlike accident reports which are reductionist and can be 
vulnerable to hindsight bias and (Dekker, 2002) (and which the original ConCA was based 
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on), this study shows many managers are aware of the influence of a wide range of distal 
factors in the causation of accidents.       
Taking a systems approach to interview analysis also provided an opportunity to explore the 
relationships between poor attitudes at the frontline and the industry-wide factors which 
attract and exacerbate these. While workers are often blamed for causing accidents because 
they lack interest in safety, work in silos, lack competence, cut corners, and have a high 
tolerance for risk, these traits can be traced to interrelated aspects of organisations and the 
industry. This approach generates new avenues for improvement which are explored under 
‘Recommendations and Future Work’ (Section 4.5). 
4.5. Recommendations and future work 
The following research agenda summarises the opportunities highlighted by taking a systems 
thinking approach, going beyond increasing regulation, qualification, training, resources and 
length of contract which are often called for but difficult to realise effectively. It provides 
guidance for implementing and shaping some establishing safety methods and refocussing the 
way forward. 
• Job enrichment research has shown that enlargement and rotation of roles can 
improve performance (Parker et al., 2017). Diversifying roles in construction could 
increase empathy, awareness, community, and the ‘big picture’ perspective, thus 
emphasising the value of each workers’ roles in the project as a whole and inspiring 
pride in their work. Cross-trade training could provide increased competence at 
minimal expense to the company; however, it could reduce quality as skills are highly 
specialised and may be unpopular as workers are unlikely to want more information 
and responsibilities.   
• “Learning legacy” programmes should be developed to improve transfer of 
knowledge between projects and awareness of innovation. These exist in high profile 
public sector projects in the UK, but there is a lack of support for smaller projects. 
Therefore, the programme should be extended to include a wide variety of projects; 
information must be brief and accessible; and manpower (particularly from architects, 
designers and engineers) allocated to seeking out and applying relevant innovation.   
• Empowering and valuing workers is an underestimated aspect of risk management. 
Engaging with workers on risk management and respecting their expertise is 
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particularly important in light of their low expectations and lack of loyalty. 
Collaboration would build vertical relationships, communication, trust, and protect 
against peer pressure.   
• Risk management should involve workers on the frontline and be integrated into 
operations. Effort is required to change the perceptions of HSE staff as an enforcer of 
rules to a facilitator of ideas. Collaboration can help to combat dissatisfaction with 
insensitive procedures and equipment, but must be initiated in a way informed by the 
traits of workers – e.g. not academically minded, intimidated by professionals, not 
inclined to speak publicly, limited fluency and comprehension of local language, and 
influenced by peer pressure.   
• Peer pressure could potentially be a powerful force for good given the need to build 
relationships quickly in a transient environment. Cultural programmes need 
persistence and repetition to account for constant change and counteract the pressures 
to prove their reputation or show-off to fit in.  
• Adaptive safety has so far been touted as a solution for intractable industries; 
however, although the successes of well-managed projects prove construction is 
tractable (Bolt et al., 2012) it is not the most efficient to manage safety in a squeezed 
industry. Although the hazards are manageable the rate of change and unpredictability 
is not; thus, an adaptive approach could benefit an environment which – for reasons of 
time pressure, language barriers, low literacy levels, context on site, unstable 
processes, and change – does not cope well with paperwork.  
5. Limitations 
These finding are based on a modest sample of experts, and as such a degree of caution is 
required when generalising these to construction as a whole. Although this type of 
exploratory expert panel study, alongside STS analysis, does generate new theories and 
support novel opportunities for improvement in OSH, future research is needed to validate 
these.  
Another limitation of the study is that is focuses on the views of managers and policy-
makers; it does not include the views of workers which would help to validate their 
perception of risk-taking and evaluate the quality of the decision-making based on these 
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influences. This is outside the scope of the current study and is another area where future 
work is needed.  
6. Conclusion  
The hazards of construction are embedded within building a physical output, both in terms of 
the practical processes needed to accomplish this and the temporary, undesignable nature of 
the workplace. This constant change makes managing risk difficult, not only within a project, 
but across the industry: The nature of the work – providing infrastructure for other businesses 
– means designs are unique, profit margins are extremely low, and work is suited to a 
dynamic network of specialist organisations contracted to specific aspects of the build. It is 
inevitable therefore that the physical nature of work and style of contract attracts workers 
who are uncommitted, physically capable, unafraid of hard work and seeking a career with 
plenty of variety. Unfortunately, these traits coincide with risk taking. Building for a client 
also means profit must be squeezed from the supply chain and building processes, leaving 
construction firms with little resource to invest in technologies which could improve 
processes, no time for change or learning, and no inclination to change because of the 
widespread acceptance that construction is risky. These top-down pressures from the client 
and bottom-up challenges from the workforce show why it is important to take a holistic 
approach to the system when managing safety.  
Construction workers are perceived as having a high risk tolerance: This has been unpacked 
by exploring how and why attitudes vary within and between workers. Risk-taking 
behaviours depend firstly upon whether they are aware of the risk, secondly whether they 
perceive that risk as tolerable, and thirdly whether they feel the rewards are worth taking said 
risk. Many factors contribute to these, including the traits of the workforce; influences on 
their decision-making; and the pressures of the industry. In terms of supporting the managers 
this study shows a disparity between those who saw workers as negligent and disobedient and 
those with more enlightened views about distal or originating influences.  
A systems thinking analysis of managers’ perceptions lends support to the view that many of 
construction’s problems are rooted within distal factors such as its transient workforce, 
financial constraints, and temporary organisations – products of a structure which is vital to 
providing unique outputs for a range of clients. Although this would be difficult to challenge, 
this paper provides advice for training and risk management which takes account of workers’ 
traits and the pressures they face from the system. It also provides supporting evidence for 
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emerging concepts in safety management: Collaborating with workers to show they are 
valued; integrating risk management in operations; increasing transfer of knowledge though 
‘learning legacy’ programmes; cross-trade training to improve their ‘big-picture perspective; 
and looking to adaptive safety to reduce paperwork and increase empowerment.  
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Appendix 1 
Interview Schedule 
Background 
1) Tell me about your role and previous experience  
a. Current position 
b. Previous experience 
 
Risk Management in Construction 
2) What makes construction so hazardous? 
3) What makes managing risk difficult? 
Safe and unsafe workers 
4) How do construction workers view risk?  
a. Describe their attitude 
b. What has given you this impression? 
 
 
5) Why do some workers behave unsafely? 
 
